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Sunhyuk Kim and Jong-Ho Jeong
In this paper, we provide a historical overview of the development of Korea’s civil society 
since its transition to democracy in 1987. After a theoretical review of civil society focused on 
the comparison between the East and the West, we analyze seven governments of Korea since the 
democratic transition in 1987 in terms of the change in civil society and its engagement with the state, 
underscoring the continued role of civil society in democratic consolidation and deepening. Then, we 
discuss some prominent characteristics of Korean civil society in the post-transitional period, such 
as the diversification of the modes of state-civil society relationship, politicization and ideological 
polarization of civil society, “political societization” of civil society, the widened gap between central 
and local civil societies, and financial dependency of civil society on the state. We conclude the paper 
with a few important cautions against excessive political societization of civil society and the resultant 
depopulation and potential delegitimation of the civil society arena.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the literature on democratic transition and consolidation, the status of South Korea 
(Korea hereinafter) is rather distinct. The Korean case is considered to be an anomaly that 
does not conform well to the repeatedly confirmed conclusion of the “elitist” paradigm that 
was predominant in the 1980s (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Higley and Gunther, 1992). 
Rather, Korea’s transition is mobilization-led and mass-ascendant, prompting many analysts 
to characterize it as a “movement-driven transition” (Cho, 1998; Kim, 2000; Choi, 2002). 
The Korean case, in fact, serves as one of the precursors of the emergent wave of “bottom-up” 
transitions that ultimately swept Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, which makes 
clear contrast with the earlier top-down “pacted” transitions in Southern Europe and Latin 
America in the 1970s and 1980s. What is even more unique in the case of Korea is that civil 
society and its mobilization has continued to play important roles even in the post-transitional 
period, long into the consolidational phase, spearheading and sustaining diverse institutional 
and policy reform campaigns (Kim, 2002).
In this paper, we examine the historical development of Korean civil society since 1987. 
We analyze how the composition of civil society and civil society’s relationship with the state 
have changed over the past 30 years of seven different governments, both conservative and 
progressive. The paper specifically proceeds as follows. We first discuss several conceptual 
and theoretical issues related to civil society. Next we compare Korean civil society before 
and after the democratic transition in 1987. Then we ponder several prominent characteristics 
of Korean civil society. We conclude the paper with a few thoughts on the future of Korean 
civil society.
* This research was supported by a Korea University Grant (K1706531). The co-authors thank the 
three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
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2. CIVIL SOCIETY: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES
Civil society is defined as the “sphere intermediate between the family and the state, 
in which social actors pursue neither profit within the market nor power within the state” 
(Schwartz, 2003: 23). Civil society consists of sustained, organized social activity that occurs 
in groups that are formed outside the state, the market, and the family. Philippe Schmitter 
(1997) encapsulates several essential characteristics of civil society: 1) “dual autonomy”—
civil society is relatively independent of both public authorities and private units of 
production and reproduction; 2) civil society has the capacity for collective action in defense 
of or in pursuit of their interests and concerns; 3) “nonusurpation”—civil society does not 
seek to replace state agents or to run the polity; and 4) civil society is voluntary in nature.
There has been an interesting discussion on comparing civil society in the West and 
the East. Schmitter (1997), after presenting a set of insightful conjectures regarding East 
Asian civil society, concludes that East Asian societies are too diverse to permit any valid 
generalizations for the region as a whole. However, there seem to exist certain distinctive 
features of East Asian civil society in contrast with European or North American ones. First 
of all, East Asian civil society seems to have a limited degree of autonomy from the state. 
Organizations in East Asian civil society have been dependent upon public authorities to a 
great degree. This is different from civil societies in Europe and North America, which has 
traditionally stressed a high degree of autonomy from the state and spontaneity in group 
formation as their essential characteristics.
In the West, the concept of civil society has always developed in opposition to that of the 
state. Civil society has been conceived as a sphere against the state. What this view implicitly 
presupposes is that the state, as a highly centralized governing apparatus, can be conceptually 
and empirically distinguished from society. Thus, the state-society relations are depicted as 
a tug of war in which state power and social power confront and conflict each other. Some 
scholars observe that the case of Korea does not deviate significantly from this classic, 
Western model of antagonistic state-civil society relations. Bruce Cumings (2002: 29), for 
example, concludes his analysis of modern political history of Korea by characterizing Korea 
as a classic case of Habermasian and Gramscian visions of civil society in action where 
popular protest has “made an indelible contribution” to democracy. In this respect, civil 
societies in West and East are not very different.
However, some other scholars have contested this oppositional view of civil society 
by questioning the concept of the centralized state and trying to develop a more nuanced 
notion. For example, Stephen Krasner (2001) defines the state based on its multiple roles: 
state as a government, state as an administrative apparatus, state as a ruling class, and state 
as a normative order. In the meanwhile, Frank Schwartz and Susan Pharr (2003) explain the 
four possible roles the state may play in relation to the formation of civil society, i.e., inspire, 
enable, constrain, and create. According to them, we need to distinguish two different scopes 
of the concept of the state: one is a narrower one meaning a ruling administration, the other is 
a wider one denoting a national community. In the West, the state is more often thought of as 
an equivalent to the former, namely as a government administration. In contrast, the state in 
East Asia has been conceptualized both as an administrative power machinery (zhengfu) and 
a broader, cultural idea of a nation (guojia).
Thus, even when the state as a political apparatus is not organizationally powerful, state 
order is considered hegemonic and totalizing, overbearing society and encroaching on the 
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lives of its people. The power of the state is engrained in the consciousness and behavior of 
the people, who negotiate and maneuver around it as if a cultural given (Siu, 1989). This has 
its origins in the Confucian tradition shared in the East Asian region, because the concept 
of the state is an extension of the concept of the family in Confucianism. According to Tu 
Weiming (1989, 1993), in the Confucian notion of the proper relation between state and 
society, civil society does not represent the space between the family and the state in an 
oppositional sense. Rather, it offers mediating cultural institutions between the two.
The distinctive features of East Asian civil society seem to derive from the different ways 
in which the public and the private are conceptualized in the West and the East. In the West, 
the public and the private seem to be differentiated more clearly than it is the case with East 
Asia, and thus, civil society, as part of the private, is clearly contrasted with the public, which 
is the domain of the state. As such, civil society in the West has appeared and developed as 
a concept and actor in opposition to the state. In East Asia, however, the line between the 
public and the private has been relatively blurred. For example, in understanding state-society 
relationships in China, many scholars have found it necessary to appreciate the overlapping 
and interlocking relations between “official (guan),” “public (gong),” and “private (si)” rather 
than presupposing a dichotomous distinction between the public and the private.
According to these scholars, elite gentry activism (political action and reaction) in late 
imperial China was engaged in three different domains consisting of guan (the arena of 
“official” or bureaucratic engagement), gong (the licit realm of “public weal” affairs), and si 
(self-interest illicitly invading the public domain), struggling to reconcile the public, private, 
and official domains (Rankin, 1990, 1993; Rowe, 1993; Wakeman, Jr., 1993, 1998). During 
this struggle, “public (gong)” responsibilities and “private (si)” interests often appear to be 
inextricably entangled and intentionally confused by communally spirited elites who were 
also demonstrably self-serving, leading to a blurring of boundaries between the public and 
the private (Wakeman, Jr., 1998: 168). As a result, in China, the public and the private grew 
categorically confused, intersected obliquely, and the lines between “official (guan),” “public 
(gong),” and “private (si)” were also less than distinct (Wakeman, Jr., 1993: 132).
The ambiguous lines between “official (guan),” “public (gong),” and “private (si)” 
led some scholars to suggest the idea of intermediate arenas between state and society in 
China. For example, Rankin argues that intermediate arenas, distinguished both from direct 
state administration or coercive control and from private spheres, particularly of family 
or other kin groups but also of individual businesses, apolitical friendship networks, and 
other activities that do not concern matters of common interest, could be found in the many 
faceted voluntary involvement of local elites in running local affairs outside of bureaucratic 
frameworks (Rankin, 1993: 160-161).1 Huang also proposed the term “third realm” to capture 
the intermediate space between state and society and presented some examples of this third 
realm in imperial, Republican, and contemporary China, such as local public services like 
water control, famine relief, or defense undertaken with the participation of both state and 
1 According to Rankin, from the 17th through the 19th century, the use of Chinese term, gong or 
public, extended in practice to the extrabureaucratic activities of the people (elites) as well as 
officials, and social autonomy involved in local affairs. Extrabureaucratic activities of the local elite 
were broad in scope, including discussion; institutional support for welfare, education, and religious 
purposes; social work; sponsorships and donations; supervision of building or repairing local 
infrastructure that does not require a permanent institutional organization, etc. (Rankin, 1993: 160-
161).
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society (Huang, 1993).
As illustrated so far, the relations between state and society in East Asia developed 
in ways different from the binary opposition which is an ideal type abstracted from early 
modern and modern Western experience. Civil society in East Asia has developed in co-
existence, not in conflict, with the state, receiving support and funding from the latter. 
Therefore, the mechanical application of the Western model of civil society to the East Asian 
experience is not appropriate and a more sophisticated alternative construct needs to be 
proposed to understand the relationships between state and society in East Asia.
3. CIVIL SOCIETY IN KOREA IN THE PRE- AND POST-TRANSITIONAL PERIODS
Korea’s civil society under pre-1987 authoritarianism comprised largely of three 
categories. The first was pro-government or even governmentalized social groups such as 
the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), Korea Employers’ Federation (KEF), and 
the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI). However, it is questionable if these social groups 
can be called civil society groups. Often openly supportive of the incumbent authoritarian 
regimes, these groups seriously lacked organizational autonomy from the state. Their leaders 
were not self-elected but selected by the government, and their management was closely 
monitored and supervised by the state. The second category of social groups included the 
outlawed underground organizations and dissident groups that were not recognized but 
repressed by the state. These groups coordinated and spearheaded intensive anti-government 
and pro-democracy movement campaigns. The last was non-political, relatively “neutral” 
social groups such as the YMCA (Young Men’s Christian Association), which were few in 
number and had little influence over politics or policymaking.
Since Korea’s transition to democracy and its first direct presidential election in 1987 
(“founding elections”), however, civil society in the country has undergone significant 
change and has resultantly become quite different from that under the previous authoritarian 
regimes. Most of all, pro-government social groups that had lacked independence from 
the authoritarian state incrementally gained autonomy from state control. Also, illegal 
underground organizations and dissident groups were granted legal status and state 
recognition. Meanwhile, new “citizens’ movement groups,” such as the Citizens’ Coalition 
for Economic Justice (CCEJ), the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM), 
and the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), emerged and mushroomed. 
The proliferation of these new social groups through the 1990s brought about substantial 
expansion of the civil society sphere in Korea. Just as Korea’s economy witnessed a 
compressed development during the 1960s-80s, Korea’s civil society sphere witnessed 
compressed development during the 1990s. As a result of all these multiple changes, civil 
society in Korea has become much more diverse and variegated as compared with that during 
the pre-transitional period. In the following, we will briefly discuss how the development 
of civil society in Korea and its relationship with the state have unfolded over the past 30 
years of seven different governments, both conservative and progressive, after the 1987 
democratic transition. We will mostly focus on those civil society groups that emerged in 
the aftermath of the democratic transition and have led various movements and campaigns 
to demand social, political, and economic reforms, because the contributions of the formerly 
“governmentalized” organizations and “neutral” associations have been marginal as 
compared with those of the new “citizens’ movement groups.”
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The first presidential election after the June Democracy Uprising in 1987, held in 
December of the same year, ironically resulted in the election of the ruling Democratic 
Justice Party candidate, Roh Tae-woo. Roh was a former military general who had been 
deeply involved in the bloody military coup of 1979-80 and the subsequent consolidation of 
the authoritarian political order. Confronted with the unbelievable, almost surreal, reality of 
Roh’s election, civil society groups, especially those groups that prematurely (and wrongly) 
concluded that they had won the strenuous pro-democracy struggle against Chun and Roh’s 
authoritarianism, could not but continue their democracy movement. They persistently 
questioned and challenged the legitimacy of the Roh government (1988-93), trying to 
convince the public that Roh’s regime was just a continuation of Chun’s. Social movement 
groups were alarmed by the Roh government’s continued hard-line policy toward civil 
society and, in particular, by the grand party merger in January 1990 to form the conservative 
Democratic Liberal Party. They concentrated their efforts on organizing a set of national 
umbrella associations, such as the National Council of University Student Representatives 
(NCUSR), the Korea Coalition for National Democracy Movement (KCNDM), the Korean 
Peasant Movement Coalition (KPMC), and the Korean Teachers’ and Educational Workers’ 
Union (KTEWU) to more effectively mobilize and coordinate their various anti-government 
struggles.
New civil society groups, on the other hand, also substantially increased in number and 
influence during the Roh government. The Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), 
one of those new civil society groups, was founded on July 7, 1989, by approximately 1,000 
professionals such as professors, lawyers, religious leaders, and others to advance economic 
justice through citizen power. Subsequently, CCEJ organized a series of movements 
demanding reinforced government regulation of real estate speculation, augmented 
supplies of public housing on long-term loans, increased property taxes for the rich and tax 
exemptions for the poor, and the independence of the central bank from the state. CCEJ’s 
various activities and campaigns were relatively well received by the public and well covered 
by the mass media.
During the next Kim Young-sam government (1993-98), Korean civil society’s skepticism 
about and challenge to the democratic legitimacy of the ruling regime noticeably diminished. 
Rather, civil society was often outwitted by the reformist government. In 1993-1995, the Kim 
government actively designed and enforced various reform measures, including punishment 
of corrupt public officials, disclosure of private assets of the public officeholders, enactment 
of a law stipulating public officeholders’ ethics, disempowerment of high ranking military 
personnel associated with the previous authoritarian regimes, reduction in the size and role of 
both military and civilian intelligence agencies, and the drastic introduction of a “real name 
banking account system” intended to cut the collusion between business and politics.
New civil society groups steadily increased their appeal and influence through the 
Kim Young-sam government. Of the new civil society groups, CCEJ was most prominent. 
In response to Kim government’s initiative to reconfigure state-civil society relations to 
facilitate broader involvement of social groups in the policymaking process and to promote 
more cooperation between the government and civil society, CCEJ practically emerged 
as a crucial partner of the government. For example, CCEJ proved instrumental in Kim’s 
campaign to clean up nepotism and influence-peddling, by building up public pressure and 
mobilizing popular support for the reform.
Meanwhile, another important civil society organization, People’s Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy (PSPD), was created in 1994. PSPD differentiated itself from 
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CCEJ, intending to synthesize the old “people’s movement” and the new “citizens’ 
movement.” PSPD emphasized at its founding that it would, dissimilar to CCEJ, place a 
focus on social systemic reforms while, similar to CCEJ, exploring new issues and adhering 
to the principle of nonviolence. PSPD successfully organized campaigns, for example, to 
monitor and evaluate the performance of government ministries and the National Assembly, 
to file lawsuits against corrupt public officials, and to protect “whistleblowers” who helped 
disclose public scandals.
During the Kim Dae-jung government (1998-2003), PSPD emerged as the most 
influential NGO in Korea, eclipsing its rival CCEJ. PSPD’s success was chiefly thanks to 
its effective response to Korea’s serious economic crisis during 1997-98 and the subsequent 
restructuring and reform. Above all, PSPD blamed big business conglomerates for the crisis 
and vigorously campaigned for speedy corporate reform, pressuring the Kim government 
to implement more reforms. PSPD’s movement, later dubbed the “Minority Shareholders’ 
Rights Movement,” was very well received and supported by citizens, intellectuals, and the 
mass media, prompting the government to accommodate and carry out many of the reform 
policies PSPD proposed and advocated.
In addition to economic reform, PSPD worked on political reform too. Several months 
before the general elections in April 2000, it organized the Nakcheon/Nakseon movement in 
cooperation with many other civil society groups under the umbrella association it formed 
called Citizens’ Solidarity for the General Elections (CSGE). The Nakcheon/Nakseon 
movement consisted of two different stages as its name suggests. The first was to release a 
list of personalities who should not be nominated by parties to run for the upcoming elections 
(Nakcheon movement). The second stage was, if those “blacklisted” candidates were 
nominated despite CSGE’s counsel, to run a campaign against their actual elections (Nakseon 
movement). According to this plan, CSGE announced a list of sixty-six politicians who 
should not be nominated on January 24 and a list of eighty-six candidates who should not 
be elected on April 3. The selection criteria for both Nakcheon and Nakseon lists included, 
for example, corruption scandals, violation of the election laws, lack of legislative activities, 
subversion of the constitutional order, instigation of regionalism, tax evasion, inappropriate 
remarks and behaviors during the National Assembly sessions, to name but a few. In the 
general elections on April 13, 2000, 59 out of 86 candidates on CSGE’s list were not elected, 
demonstrating the great efficacy of CSGE’s movement.
PSPD also played a role of “policy entrepreneur” during the Kim Dae-jung government, 
prominently in the process leading up to the legislation of the National Basic Livelihood 
Security (NBLS) Act in 1999. Since its creation in 1994, PSPD had strived to raise public 
awareness of the need for a reform of Korea’s social assistance program. Taking advantage of 
the unprecedented economic crisis in 1997-98, PSPD highlighted, both to the general public 
and to the legislators, the necessity of enacting the NBLS Act. To overcome the indifference 
of legislators and the resistance of bureaucrats, it formed an umbrella association called 
the Solidarity for the Enactment of NBLS Act to launch a nationwide campaign (Fiori and 
Kim, 2011: 72). Thanks to PSPD’s effective and timely action, the bill eventually passed the 
National Assembly in August 1999 and was enacted in October 2000.
The influence of civil society groups in Korea continued to expand during the following 
Roh Moo-hyun government (2003-08).2 There was significant growth in the environmental 
2 The number of civil society groups rapidly increased from 3,900 in 1997 to 7,600 in 1998 to 18,180 
in 1999 to 23,017 in 2000 to 25,886 in 2001 (Civic Movement Communication Center, 1997, 2000, 
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movement, for instance, the movement against the Saemangeum Reclamation Project 
organized by a coalition of environmental groups, which ultimately persuaded the Local 
Court to rule that the project should be discontinued. Although this decision was later 
reversed at the Higher Court and the Supreme Court, the movement clearly demonstrated 
the importance of ensuring citizens’ deliberation and consent before carrying out any major 
construction projects. Civil society groups also campaigned against the Korea-US Free Trade 
Agreement (KORUS FTA). Concerned about a range of negative effects a ratified KORUS 
FTA would exert on the Korean economy, civil society groups worked together with trade 
unions, peasant organizations, the progressive Korea Democratic Labor Party, and other 
movement organizations to spearhead nationwide protests against the government’s policy to 
pursue a KORUS FTA.
One of the most important developments in Korean civil society during the Roh Moo-
hyun government was the emergence and expansion of “conservative” social groups. Social 
groups such as the Free Citizens’ Alliance of Korea (FCAK) and the Korea Forum for 
Progress (KFP) came to influence the policymaking process. Between 1987 in which the 
transition to democracy took place and 2003 when Roh was inaugurated, the civil society 
arena in Korea had generally been dominated by “progressive” social groups that largely 
agreed on democratic reforms, economic equality, and peaceful engagement with North 
Korea. The public was also sympathetic to those progressive social groups. This would soon 
change after the rise of “conservative” social groups. These conservative groups or “New 
Right” organizations had different ideological inclinations from the progressive, decrying too 
much democracy aka “populism,” lamenting the loss of global competitiveness due to the 
“overemphasis” on public welfare and redistribution, and advocating a more hard-line policy 
toward the North.
The defeat of the progressive camp and the victory of conservative Lee Myung-
bak in the 2007 presidential election were to a large extent enabled by the crystallization 
and mobilization of conservative social groups during the Roh government. Since its 
inauguration, the Lee government (2008-13) systematically carried out policies to debilitate 
progressive social groups and to strengthen conservative ones. For example, it changed the 
composition of various government-affiliated deliberative and advisory committees that had 
been dominated by leaders and activists of progressive social groups during the preceding 
government, by replacing their members with those from conservative “New Right” groups. 
Also, in the presidential office, the position in charge of civil society affairs called “Senior 
Presidential Secretary on Civil Society Affairs” was now downgraded to a junior secretary 
position.
The first year of the Lee presidency was marred by a series of popular protests and 
candlelight demonstrations. The most notable civic mobilization took place during May-
July 2008. The apparent motive for this round of mobilization was citizens’ concern with the 
safety of the beef imported from the U.S. But the protests later expanded to address other 
outstanding policy issues at the time, such as the opaque manners in which foreign policies 
of the country were made; the controversial “Korean Grand Canal” construction project; 
educational reform; and privatization of state corporations.
Another high tide of mass mobilization happened in January of 2009. A group of Yongsan 
tenants who had been opposing the redevelopment project of the Lee government and 
demanding fair compensation for the re-settlement were occupying a building to wage sit-
2003, 2006, 2009).
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in protests. In the middle of the violent confrontation between the protesters and the police, 
a fire broke out to kill six people—five tenants and one policeman. When the prosecutorial 
investigation concluded that the protesters were to blame for the tragedy, civil society groups 
mobilized themselves to demand a full investigation, appropriate government response, and a 
promise that similar tragedies would not recur.3
Park Geun-hye was elected to the Korean presidency in December 2012 and was 
inaugurated in February 2013. In terms of its policies towards civil society, the Park 
government (2013-17) was not very different from the previous Lee government. It adhered 
to a hard-line stance on illegal anti-government demonstrations, keeping wary eyes on the 
progressive civil society groups and their potential alliance with opposition parties and 
strictly applying “law and order” to candlelight protestors and labor strikers. On the other 
hand, the Park government maintained a close and cooperative relationship with conservative 
social groups.
Immediately after Park’s inauguration in February 2013, a series of popular 
demonstrations, signature collection campaigns, public announcements of anti-government 
statements, in which activists, students, workers, religious leaders, professors, and teachers 
took part, followed suit to protest against the intelligence agency’s suspected intervention 
into the 2012 presidential election. But a greater tide of civic mobilization came in the wake 
of the tragic sinking of Sewol ferry on April 16, 2014. More than 300 people, mostly young 
high school students, were killed in the accident. Greatly frustrated by the nonchalance and 
ineptitude of the top leadership and the irresponsibility of the relevant ministries in handling 
the disaster and its aftermath, Koreans from all walks of life joined popular protests in 
support of the victims of the tragedy against the Park government.
The latest upsurge of civil society’s mobilization in Korea occurred in late 2016 through 
early 2017. Enraged by the media disclosure that Park Geun-hye had been influenced and 
manipulated by a private friend who assumed no public post to wring money from chaebol 
tycoons, order illegal dismissals of uncooperative public officials, and interfere in various 
phases of the policy process, citizens launched a row of mass mobilization asking for a full 
investigation into the scandal and proper punishment of the president. After several months 
of massive, intensive, but consistently peaceful weekend demonstrations and protests in 
the heart of the capital, Park was finally impeached and divested of her presidency in early 
March of 2017. Park’s successful impeachment, the first of its kind in the history of Korea, 
reaffirms the pivotal role civil society and its mobilization play in contemporary Korean 
politics.
4. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF KOREAN CIVIL SOCIETY
Civil society after Korea’s democratic transition in 1987 features several significant 
characteristics. The first is the diversification of the relationship it forges and develops with 
the state. Under the previous authoritarian rule, the state-society relationship was mainly 
one of confrontation and conflict, suppression and resistance. But after democratization, 
the relationship has become far variegated to incorporate other types and modes such as 
competition and cooperation. The government and civil society groups now compete to 
3 Most of the protesters prosecuted at the time were amnestied by the Moon Jae-in government on 
December 29, 2017.
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come up with better policy proposals. They sometimes cooperate to generate and disseminate 
innovative policy solutions. The rapid growth and expansion of the civil society arena have 
led to the rise of various modes of relationship—cooperation, mutual assistance, competition, 
and conflict—within civil society itself too. The competition and cooperation between CCEJ 
and PSPD over various political, economic, and social issues during the past governments is 
an excellent example in point.
Second, Korea’s civil society has increasingly shown politicization and ideological 
polarization. This is especially noticeable with regards to the strategy and policy toward 
North Korea, where Korea’s civil society has been sharply divided between left and 
right, progressive and conservative over the Sunshine policy during the Kim Dae-jung 
administration. Such polarization has affected civil society’s political involvement as well. 
The progressive PSPD strongly supported left-wing governments such as those under Kim 
Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. The conservative New Right served as a reliable sponsor for 
the right-wing governments of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye.
Third, Korea’s civil society has actively engaged in real politics, with civic leaders 
frequently joining political circles. Even the new civil society groups that appeared after 
the 1987 democratization have tended to concentrate on “old” political, economic, and 
social issues rather than post-modern issues that had been the focus of the “new social 
movements” in the West. As civil society continued to address conventional issues and 
demand institutional reforms, there has been steady “political societization” of civil society, 
in which individuals or groups of civil society have directly joined or switched to political 
society. As groups, civil society organizations have been deeply involved in the emergence 
and governance of past administrations. Examples include CCEJ for the Kim Young-sam 
administration, PSPD for the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, and the New 
Right for the Lee Myung-bak administration. As well, there have been numerous examples 
of individuals joining real politics. The late Park Se-il, one of the founding members of the 
CCEJ, served as a senior presidential secretary for the Kim Young-sam administration as 
well as being a member of the Korean National Assembly representing the conservative 
Grand National Party. Lee Seok-yeon, the former chairman of the New Right Union, served 
as the Minister of Government Legislation under the Lee Myung-bak administration. Park 
Won-soon and Kim Ki-sik, the two iconic founders of PSPD and leading innovators of civic 
activism in post-transitional Korea, changed their coats to become the mayor of Seoul and a 
National Assemblyman, respectively. Both obtained their nominations from the progressive 
Democratic Party—the political party of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun who led the left-
wing governments strongly supported by PSPD.
The current Moon Jae-in government (2017-present), which came to power in the 
aftermath of the intense candlelight protests that had brought about the impeachment of 
Park Geun-hye, is likely to represent another apex in Korean civil society’s direct political 
involvement. The Moon government officially acknowledges that it is the beneficiary and 
outgrowth of the “Candlelight Revolution of 2016-17” that ousted the Park government. The 
new government reinstated the senior secretary position devoted to civil society matters in 
the presidential office. Dealing with civil society, social innovation, and institutional reform, 
this position, the “Social Innovation Senior Secretary,” is an expanded and reinforced version 
of the “Civil Society Senior Secretary” during the Roh Moo-hyun years. Moon himself was 
the Civil Society Senior Secretary between 2004 and 2005.
With the view of realizing “co-governance with civil society,” a sizable number of 
social movement activists and civic leaders have been appointed as presidential staff and 
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cabinet members of the Moon Jae-in government. In the cabinet, six out of 25 minister-level 
personnel are former leaders of civic groups. Examples include Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Education Kim Sang-kon (former co-chairman of Professors for Democracy 
and former chairman of the Korea Professors’ Union); Minister of Justice Park Sang-ki 
(former co-representative of CCEJ); Minister of Gender Equality and Family Chung Hyun-
baek(former co-representative of PSPD); Minister of the Environment Kim Eun-kyung 
(former head of Sustainability Center Jiwoo); Kim Sang-jo, Chairperson of Fair Trade 
Commission (former head of the Center for Economic Reform, PSPD); and Pak Un Jong, 
Chairperson of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (former co-head of PSPD). 
There are even more former civil society leaders among the presidential staff. Jang Ha-sung, 
former chair of PSPD and a member of Solidarity for Economic Reform, was appointed as 
the Presidential Senior Advisor for Policy Affairs. Cho Kuk, who was also an active member 
of PSPD, is now the Senior Presidential Secretary for Civil Affairs. Cho Hyun-ok, who 
formerly represented Korea Women’s Political Solidarity, is currently the Senior Presidential 
Secretary for Personnel Affairs. And Ha Seung-chang, Senior Presidential Secretary for 
Social Innovation, used to work at CCEJ.
It is no surprise in this regard that the Moon Jae-in era is being called “the heyday of 
PSPD,” as the administration has drafted so many civic leaders who were or are associated 
with the progressive NGO. What is notable is that these former civic leaders have come 
to occupy positions in areas related to the law and the economy (e.g., Minister of Justice, 
Senior Presidential Secretary for Civil Affairs, Presidential Senior Advisor for Policy Affairs, 
Chairperson of Fair Trade Commission). Concerning the environment also, both the Minister 
and Vice Minister of the Environment have been drawn from civil society. The civic leaders’ 
dramatic advance into politics under the Moon Jae-in government is seen as a renaissance 
and revival of civil society after being driven to near-extinction during the nine years under 
the past two conservative administrations. But at the same time, there is stinging criticism 
that civic groups have turned into a “fast track” to officialdom or a “stepping stone” for 
political appointments. All this “political societization” or even “statization” could result in 
the “hollowing-out” of civil society, a drainage of civic leaders and a general erosion of the 
civil society arena.
Fourth, most civic groups’ activities have been concentrated in the Seoul area and 
focused on politics at the center. As mentioned, Korea’s civil society has been actively 
involved in real politics, and with such increasing “political societization,” it has deepened 
its involvement in central politics but has given relatively little attention to regional and local 
problems. As a corollary, a great gap has been created between the civil society at the center 
and the civil society in local areas. Therefore, compared with the civil society in the center 
that performs various functions, the civil society in local areas still remains underdeveloped. 
Reducing the gap between central civic organizations and local and regional civic groups has 
become an important task for the deepening of democracy in Korea.
Lastly, Korea’s civil society after democratization has become financially dependent on 
the state. The Kim Dae-jung administration legislated the “NPO Assistance Act” and started 
to support civic groups that had played a major role in the democratization of Korea. This 
greatly helped many civil groups resolve their financial problems but at the same time made 
them depend on state funding.4 Past administrations have shown discernable differences 
4 In 2017, for example, the Ministry of the Interior and Safety selected 200 programs out of 429 
applications submitted by civil society organizations and granted 6.4 billion Korean Won (http://
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in their rather selective funding for civic groups based on their ideological preferences. 
For instance, the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations gave more funding to 
progressive civic groups, whereas the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations 
provided more funding to conservative civic groups. As a result, the preferential state 
funding for civil society groups has not only aggravated civil society’s financial dependency 
on the state but also cast profound doubt on the neutrality and autonomy of civic groups. 
Civil society groups in Korea are yet to devise innovative ways to wean away from financial 
dependency on the state and to achieve stronger budgetary independence.
These five characteristics of Korean civil society in the post-transitional period are 
evidently interconnected. Moreover, some of them are causally correlated. For example, 
as the state-civil society relationship becomes diversified and therefore allows room for 
cooperation, the ruling democratic regime is tempted to solicit and mobilize support from 
civil society to reinforce its legitimacy and augment its electoral basis, leading to the 
politicization and fragmentation of civil society along the ideological cleavages in the 
political society. Also, the incumbent government, in its effort to curry favor from and form 
an alliance with civil society, also uses various budgetary support programs to placate and 
manage civil society groups, thus increasing the financial dependency of civil society on the 
state.
Yet, what is more important than the connectedness or causal correlation between the 
five characteristics is the common denominator which underlies all of them: the undeniably 
palpable presence and impact of a strong state. The loosening and eventual collapse of the 
authoritarian order and the subsequent liberalization of the political arena allowed diverse 
modes of state-civil society relations to emerge. Civil society groups, at last, has wrung itself 
out of the binary trap of either conflict or cooptation (or incorporation) to forge a range of 
new relationships with the state like confrontation, competition, and cooperation. But the 
Korean state, still powerful and resourceful after the democratic transition, has tended to 
use civil society elements selectively for various political purposes, therefore resulting in 
politicization and ideological polarization of the civil society arena.
Civil society’s direct engagement with real politics, that is, “political societization” of 
civil society, originates from civil society’s frustration with “indirect” reform movement and 
campaign to transform the legislature and political parties. When civil society leaders realized 
that the two rounds of blacklisting movement in 2000 and 2004 had not fundamentally 
transformed the political arena and culture, some of them decided to directly plunge into 
politics. However, whether such direct conversion is more effective than civic movement in 
bringing about systemic change is yet to be seen and assessed.
That civic activism is concentrated in the capital is also a manifestation of the 
disproportionate importance of central politics in Korea. What Gregory Henderson (1968) 
aptly dubbed the “politics of the vortex” to characterize Korean politics remains valid. 
Politics in Korea still revolves around the central government and the legislative and 
judicial institutions in Seoul. The power of the central government with its vast bureaucratic 
apparatus also explains the financial dependency of civil society on the state. The central 
government is equipped with various financial and regulatory instruments to affect and, if 
it wants to, control civil society organizations. In sum, the five prominent characteristics of 
Korean civil society, formed historically, point to the still potent effect of a lingering strong 
state that has survived the post-transitional and post-developmental phase in the 1980s and 
news1.kr/articles/?2961379).
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even the economic crisis of the late 1990s. The Korean state still enjoys enormous power to 
affect civil society’s composition, configuration, strategies, and activities.
5. CONCLUSION
Unlike many nascent democracies where civil society played no role at all, played a role 
only up to the transitional phase, or stopped playing a significant role in the consolidational 
stage, Korea is distinct in that civil society has significantly contributed to both the transition 
and the consolidation of democracy. Upon a closer look, however, we notice that there have 
been important changes in civil society and its engagement with the state over different 
governments in the past three decades.
For the first three consecutive governments after the 1987 democratization, there was 
an identifiable pattern of augmented and deepened cooperation between civil society and 
the government. Civil society groups organized and carried out various movements and 
campaigns, and the democratic governments accommodated civil society’s grievances and 
demands. Meanwhile, the general public opinion and social atmosphere remained supportive 
of democracy and democratization. Koreans were largely sympathetic to and patient with 
those civil society activists who had risked their careers and lives in their struggle against 
the authoritarian regimes. Korean citizens in general felt guilty and grateful towards former 
movement activists. However, during the Roh Moo-hyun government, a new cycle of 
mobilization (by progressive civil society groups) vs. countermobilization (by conservative 
groups) became prominent and continued into the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye 
governments. Now, the main schism in civil society is no longer between radical and 
moderate citizens’ movement within the progressive camp, but between the progressive camp 
and the conservative camp. This ideological polarization of civil society and the resultant 
confrontation between the two camps may have originated from the debate and clash between 
pro-Sunshiners and anti-Sunshiners with respect to Kim Dae-jung’s engagement policy 
toward North Korea. Whatever the origin is, civil society in Korea today is clearly embattled, 
which has in turn considerably diminished the unity, credibility, and legitimacy of the civil 
society vis-à-vis the state, political society, or market.
Now, the political drama of 2016-17 in Korea has swung the pendulum of history to 
the left and brought about another progressive government. As discussed above, the new 
government has drawn a significant number of leaders from the civil society realm. With 
the progressive government’s comeback, civil society in Korea is likely to witness another 
heyday and exert greater influence on politics and policymaking. Meanwhile, the general 
trends characterizing Korean civil society will endure: organizational and functional 
differentiation, greater diversity in the mode of civil society-state relations, deepened 
ideological polarization, increased political societization and the consequential depopulation 
of civil society, and escalated concerns about the concentration of civil society activities 
in the Seoul area and the financial dependency of civil society on the state. All in all, civil 
society in Korea is at an important crossroads.
With the inauguration of a progressive and civil society-friendly government, civil society 
in Korea is being offered with numerous new opportunities. At the same time, however, it 
is being confronted with a herculean challenge: how to retain autonomy and vitality while 
cooperating and collaborating with the state. The typical civil society-state relations during 
the pre-transitional period were a classic example of democracy-championing civil society vs. 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN KOREA SINCE 1987 13
repressive authoritarian state. But after the transition, democracy no longer solely belongs to 
civil society. The state is now also an institutional embodiment of democratic legitimacy and 
mandate. This state, still politically potent and financially endowed, is intent on influencing, 
utilizing, mobilizing, politicizing, polarizing, depopulating, appeasing, and subsidizing civil 
society.
In this regard, the pre-transitional period, in which the Korean case seemed more 
similar to the Western model of “civil society in conflict with the state,” might have been 
an exception. At the time, Korea, unlike China and Japan where civil society looked so 
entwined and colluded with the state, seemed to represent an exception to the East Asian 
pattern, approximating the West where the anti-state, oppositional vision of civil society had 
been predominant. But now, with the conflictual phase of democratic transition completed, 
everything seems to be in flux in Korea. It remains to be seen whether the reputation and 
credibility of Korean civil society, with so much of it enmeshed with the state and political 
society, will remain intact and untarnished despite the vicissitudes of the performance of the 
incumbent government. If Korean civil society retains its combative and contentious nature 
it used to have during the pre-transitional period, we will be able to theorize that the Korean 
civil society is indeed an empirical anomaly in comparison and in contrast with China and 
Japan where civil society exists in symbiosis with the ruling state. But if Korean civil society 
does not attain and maintain autonomy and independence from the strong state that has 
tremendous symbolic, moral, organizational, budgetary, and popular resources vis-à-vis civil 
society, we may have to revise our existing interpretation of state-civil society relations in 
Korea: we may have to acknowledge that Korea is not significantly different from the other 
East Asian countries where civil society is engaged in activities only under the aegis of the 
strong state, thereby corroborating the traditional stereotypical image of blurred boundary 
between the public and the private in the East. Only time will reveal the true nature of Korean 
civil society.
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